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The Portuguese Slump and Crash





Between 2000 and 2012, the Portuguese economy grew less than the United States
during the Great Depression and less than Japan during its lost decade. This paper asks
why this happened, with a particular focus on the slump between 2000 and 2007. It
describes the main facts of Portugal’s recent economic history, evaluates some possible
explanations for its dismal performance, and proposes a new hypothesis based on the
misallocation of abundant capital flows from abroad. I put forward a model of credit
frictions to show that if financial integration exceeds financial deepening, productivity
will fall, generating a slump as relatively unproductive firms in the nontradables sector
expand at the expense of more productive tradables firms. This explanation can also
potentially account for the similarities and the differences between Portugal on the one
hand, and Ireland and Spain on the other, during this period, and for some features of
the crash in Portugal after 2010.
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Writing 10 years after the introduction of the European common currency, the vice
president of the European Central Bank, Lucas Papademos, stated unequivocally that “the
euro has been a resounding success” (Papademos 2009). The euro was by then a reserve
currency, and inflation was stable and on target. Economic growth in the euro area had
not fallen relative to the previous two decades, and employment had increased significantly,
while capital markets had become more integrated, and southern Europe had benefited from
sustained low interest rates. Papademos (2009) further argued that the countries within the
euro area had been better protected from the financial crisis of 2007-08 than others in the
European Union.
Yet even before the global financial crisis, there were warning signs about some of the
countries in the euro area. One of the more pressing alerts came from the small country
of Portugal and was brought to the attention of economists and policymakers in a notable
article by Olivier Blanchard (2007). Portugal, Blanchard observed, had been in a slump since
2000, with anemic productivity, almost no economic growth, and increasing unemployment.
At the same time, wages had been rising and the country’s competitiveness falling, and both
the government and the country’s private sector were accumulating debt at a rapid pace.
Most, but not all, of the same issues were also present in Greece, Ireland, and Spain, but did
not seem so pressing since their economies were growing and, with the exception of Greece,
fiscal consolidation was under way.
Many dismissed these alarm signs at the time. Portugal’s extensive borrowing from
abroad could be justified as borrowing against expected future growth, as the Portuguese
economy converged with the European core. Or perhaps Portugal was becoming the Florida
of Europe, to which wealthy northern Europeans were sending their capital in the expectation
of migrating for their retirement. The Portuguese slump was greeted with recommendations
for structural reforms that are as often repeated as they are sterile—the constant verdict on
the country regardless of the state of its economy.
The severity and extent of the crisis that has affected so many European countries since
2009 dismisses this complacency. Understanding what has been happening in Europe—and
the European periphery in particular—is one of the great challenges facing macroeconomists
today (Shambaugh 2012). Portugal in the 2000s experienced neither a housing boom like
Spain and Ireland, nor as rampant an increase in public debt as Greece, nor does it suffer
from Italy’s chronic political instability. Yet since 2010 all five countries have been in a
similar state of crisis. Because Portugal was one of the first countries where the symptoms
were identified, it is a good place to look for clues on what is behind the crisis.
2













Portugal	  2000-­‐12	   USA	  1929-­‐41	   Japan	  1992-­‐2004	  
There are a few more reasons why understanding what has happened to the Portuguese
economy since 2000 is of interest. First, economic growth has been as bad as it gets for a
developed economy. Figure 1 shows real GDP per capita in Portugal since 2000, along with
the same measure for the United States from 1929 to 1941 and Japan from 1992 to 2004.
Although Portugal never went through as steep a contraction as did the United States in the
1930s, its population today is poorer, relative to the start of the slump, than Americans were
at the end of the Great Depression or the Japanese after their lost decade. These extreme
periods of dismal economic performance offer an opportunity to learn about the mechanisms
that drive the macroeconomy, beyond the obvious potential for improving welfare.
Second, in the postwar era before 2000, Portugal gradually integrated with the rest
of Europe, and the milestones in this process came with periods when Portugal was one
of the fastest-growing countries in the world. Income per capita doubled in the decade
after 1960, when Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association. The years after
joining the European Community in 1986 were likewise marked by great progress. Yet the
advent of European monetary union marked the beginning of Portugal’s prolonged slump.
Understanding the difference between these episodes should yield lessons on the benefits and
costs of economic integration.
Third, the main features of the crisis bear a remarkable similarity to the well-documented
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history of capital inflows and sudden stops in Latin America in the past 20 years (Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart 1996), and to the crisis in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s.
The events in the euro crisis provide a new testing ground for our understanding of cap-
ital account liberalization (Henry 2007), sudden stops (Calvo 1998), and currency unions
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2011). In spite of the similarities, Portugal’s slump in 2000-07,
following a mild boom in 1995-2000 and followed by a crash after 2008, is a distinctively new
phenomenon relative to these previous instances of sudden stops. Understanding the slump
may thus provide valuable hints about the mechanisms through which large and sudden
capital inflows may have harmful effects, and what can policy do about them.
As important as it is, explaining the Portuguese economy since 2000 is not easy. Why did
Portugal receive such large capital inflows? Why did they come even though productivity had
stopped growing? Why did the economy slump, in spite of the availability of this capital?
And why did Greece, Ireland, and Spain, under similar circumstances and facing similar
shocks, enjoy a boom at the same time? These are some of the questions this paper tries to
answer.
Section 1 presents the key facts that make the recent behavior of the Portuguese econ-
omy both interesting and puzzling. Because Portugal did not experience a deep and rapid
contraction, like that in the United States during the Great Depression, it is hard to identify
any one sudden shock that triggered the events that followed. Portugal’s experience is in-
stead closer to that of Japan, with a prolonged period of little or no growth, and like Japan’s
experience it has generated competing hypotheses to explain it. Section 1 puts forward a
narrative to explain the 2000-07 period, when the economy was barely growing in spite of
large capital inflows. I propose that the Portuguese slump was the combined result of one
major shock and one persistent feature of its economy: the large capital flows that came
with the integration of capital markets that followed the euro, and the underdeveloped Por-
tuguese financial market. I argue that the weakness of Portugal’s financial sector caused the
capital inflows to be largely misallocated, leading to an expansion in the country’s relatively
unproductive nontradables sector, and thus to a fall in measured productivity. On top of
this, taxes were increased to meet past commitments to old-age pensions that had not been
dealt with in timely fashion. Section 1 also critiques some proposed alternative causes for
the slump, including trade shocks, discretionary fiscal spending, and rigid labor markets.
To further investigate this proposed explanation, section 2 presents a model of an open
economy with two key ingredients. First, the economy comprises both a tradables and a
nontradables sector. Second, credit is allocated to the nontradables sector through a banking
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system that collects funds domestically and from abroad, subject to collateral constraints.
In the model, the shock that triggers the slump is the relaxation of the financing constraint
on foreign capital; in the real world this can be interpreted as the introduction of the euro.
Yet because the domestic credit market is underdeveloped, banks are unwilling to extend
credit to existing productive firms, which are already operating at their collateral constraint.
Instead the new funds flow into new, inefficient firms, worsening the misallocation of capital
in the economy. The economy therefore slumps even as the real exchange rate strengthens
and the nontradables sector expands.
A growing recent literature explores the role of capital misallocation in explaining why
differences in income per capita persist across countries (see Restuccia and Rogerson 2013
for a survey). I suggest in this paper that the same mechanisms may also be behind ma-
jor slumps at the medium-term, business-cycle frequency, like that experienced recently by
the Portuguese economy. Future work might be able to test whether relative poverty and
propensity for slumps are related through the economic mechanisms that this literature
suggests.
Section 3 explores the model further in three directions. First, it investigates whether
the misallocation story can quantitatively account for the size of the slump. Second, it
considers the predictions of the model for other countries, trying especially to understand
the many similarities, but also the few differences, between Portugal and two other countries
on the European periphery, Ireland and Spain. I suggest that, if one assumes that taxes had
not risen and that the economy were more financially developed, then the same model that
explains the Portuguese slump can also account for the booms in Ireland and Spain during
this period. Third, the paper assesses the relative contributions of capital misallocation and
the increase in taxes.
Section 4 looks at the period before the slump, between 1995 and 2000 when the Por-
tuguese economy boomed, and after the slump, especially the crash from 2010 onward. I
present the main facts and interpret them in a way consistent with my account of the slump.
The Portuguese experience is not markedly different from existing models of the euro crisis,
so I discuss their key ingredients and how they match the Portuguese evidence. Section 5
concludes.
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1 The Portuguese Slump: Facts and a Narrative
The typical paper describing the weaknesses of the Portuguese economy invariably mentions
the following:
• Portugal’s low average educational attainment, an inheritance of the dictatorship that
ruled between 1933 and 1974 without making a serious investment in literacy or higher
education. In Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee’s (2010) data set, average years of
schooling for those aged above 25 was 4.1 in Portugal in 1975, compared with 8.9 in
Ireland, 6.3 in Greece, and 5.7 in Italy. By 1995 these gaps had only barely been
reduced.
• Portugal’s low total factor productivity (TFP), which meant that even periods of catch-
up to the European average in the last 50 years were driven by capital deepening
rather than by productivity increases. Reis (2011) performs a development accounting
exercise on Portugal’s income per capita in 2000 and concludes that half of the gap to
the incomes of Spain, Germany, or the United States is due to differences in TFP, with
the other half due to low schooling.
• The rapid increase in the size of the government following the democratic revolution
of 1974. Portugal had trouble controlling its public finances, and debt crises brought
about International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs in 1977-78 and in 1983-85. During
the 1980s and 1990s, there was extensive hiring in the public sector (Carreira 2011).
• The rigid labor market, with high costs of firing. Blanchard and Pedro Portugal (2001)
note that although the unemployment rate in Portugal and the United States was on
average the same over 1985-2000, the flow of workers through the labor market as a
proportion of employment in Portugal was about one-quarter as large.
• The inefficient legal system, with long judicial delays. Simeon Djankov and others
(2003) estimate that it took 420 days to collect a check returned for nonpayment in
Portuguese courts, compared with 234 days on average in their sample of 109 countries,
and 272 days among countries with a legal system based on the French model.
• The inability to compete in world trade markets because of specialization in low-wage
and low-value-added goods, which were especially hurt by competition in the late 1990s
from Eastern Europe and China.
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All of these factors are surely important to an understanding of Portugal’s level of de-
velopment and income relative to other countries in Europe over the last 40 years. What is
disappointing is that discussions of the slump since 2000 often start from the same list of
facts. This risks confusing levels and changes. Ultimately, the facts listed above are not an
answer for what caused Portugal to stop growing after 2000, instead of in some other year
when all of these same hindrances to growth were also present.1
The account that follows focuses on the period of the slump. I proceed in the style of a
narrative, describing the main features of the data in a way that suggests a compelling reason
for the slump. In each of the following subsections, I also present alternative hypotheses that
have been put forward, along with at least one salient feature of the data that casts doubt on
these alternative accounts. The reader is referred to Blanchard (2007), the volumes edited by
Francesco Franco (2009) and Pedro Lains (2009), Vitor Bento (2010b), Fernando Alexandre
and others (2012), and IMF (2013) for alternative discussions of these hypotheses, which I
sometimes defend in this paper, but sometimes also criticize.
1.1 Dismal Macroeconomic Performance
Table 1 shows the levels of some of Portugal’s main economic indicators in 2007 and their
changes from 2000 to 2007. (The sources for all of the data in the paper are listed in appendix
A.) In 2000 Portugal was a rich country by world standards, but the poorest of the 12
countries that initially formed the euro area. From then through 2007, real GDP per capita
grew by a meager 4.3 percent, for a 0.6 percent annual growth rate. Consumption grew faster
than output during this period, and real wages increased in spite of rising unemployment.
The unemployment rate in 2007 was 8.9 percent, the highest it had been since 1960 with
the exception of 1985, and almost half of that unemployment rate was generated between
2000 and 2007. Portugal was going through a slump, and consumers and workers bore the
consequences.
The last two columns of the table compare these growth rates with those in two compari-
son groups: the euro area as a whole, and a weighted average of Spain (50 percent), Germany
(30 percent) and France (20 percent), three countries that accounted for approximately half
of all Portuguese exports and imports during this period (the weight for each country is given
1Moreover, Portugal has seen structural reforms and progress, in spite of its poor economic performance.
For instance, large investments in education in the 1990s raised average years of schooling from 6.8 in 2000
to 7.7 in 2010, and scores on the PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) mathematics and




Table 1. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Portugal and Its Trading Partners, 2000-07 
 
















  Annualized growth rate (percent) 
Real GDP per capita €15,961 0.61 1.34 1.55 
Real consumption per capita €10,429 1.04 0.95 1.38 
Real consumption per employee  0.38 0.27 -0.10 
   
    Change (percentage points) 
Unemployment rate 8.9% 4.40 -0.90 -1.61 
Annual interest rate on 10-year 
government bonds 
4.42% -1.17 -1.13 -1.14 
 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a. The 12 countries that had adopted the euro as their currency by 2000. 
b. Weighted average of Spain (50 percent), Germany (30 percent), and France (20 percent), which together account 





in parentheses).2 GDP growth during this period in the euro area, and among the countries
that are Portugal’s main trading partners, was more than twice as rapid as in Portugal. And
while unemployment was rising in Portugal, it was falling elsewhere in Europe.
One explanation for the Portuguese slump argues that it was due to irresponsible wage
growth in the country, rendering it uncompetitive in international markets and causing the
rise in unemployment. The fact commonly cited to support this hypothesis is that unit
labor costs in Portugal rose about 20 percent relative to those in Germany during this
period. However, this statistic is misleading for two reasons. First, although during this
period real wages fell significantly in Germany, this decline was not representative of the
euro area as a whole or of Portugal’s other trading partners. Second, most of the increase
in relative unit labor costs was due not to rising wages in Portugal—as the table shows,
Portuguese wages did not much rise faster than in the two comparison groups—but to the
fact that output per worker barely changed in Portugal during those 7 years, whereas it
grew significantly elsewhere in Europe. As Blanchard (2007) emphasizes, adjusting wages
to productivity would have required falling real wages throughout this period, which, as
2In most of the tables, “euro area” refers to the original 12 participants in European monetary union
(EA12): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. In some cases, however, data were available only for the euro area 15, which also
includes Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia. Because these three countries account for well under 1 percent of the
GDP of the euro area, the numbers for the EA12 and the EA15 are almost identical for the indicators that










Capital account  
Stock of net foreign assets, 2007 -101.0 
Change in net foreign assets, 2000-07 -78.5 
  
Current account (cumulative)  
Current account balance, 2000-07 -51.0 
Trade balance, 2000-07 -46.5 
Trade balance ex-EU, 2000-07 -19.0 
 





Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martin Uribe (2011) note, is a rare occurrence in developed
economies.
The last row of the table shows the large reduction in long-term interest rates in Portugal
during these 7 years, in line with what happened all over the euro area. It is open to debate
to what extent this decline was due to the removal of the exchange rate risk premium with
the adoption of the euro, or to unrealistically low expectations of default risk. Either way,
it was associated with a flow of capital from abroad, which I discuss next.
1.2 The Shock: Capital Flowing from Abroad
Portugal owed foreigners AC165 billion in 2007, an amount approximately equal to the whole
of its GDP for that year (table 2). Most of this debt was accumulated during the slump;
if one goes further back, to the mid-1990s, Portugal’s net foreign debt was close to zero.
During the slump Portugal borrowed vast amounts from abroad, in one of the largest capital
influxes the country has ever experienced.
One explanation for the slump would argue that productivity exogenously stopped grow-
ing temporarily during the early 2000s, explaining the fall in output, but was expected to
grow faster in the future. In the meantime Portugal would borrow abroad to sustain a steady
growth rate of consumption, in the reasonable expectation that growth would resume shortly.
This demand-based explanation for the surge in Portuguese borrowing faces three problems.
First, the expected future growth never materialized. Moreover, as table 1 showed, con-
sumption was also stagnant, even if not as stagnant as GDP. Second, large capital inflows,
coming mostly from Germany, were also going to Greece, Ireland and Spain during these
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years (Lane 2013), even though these countries were booming. Third, the interest rate at
which Portugal borrowed fell during this period. Rather than a shock to Portugal’s demand
for borrowing, these facts suggest a euro area-wide supply shock to capital.
The last three rows in table 2 break down the sources of the accumulation of foreign
debt. The change in net foreign assets is by definition equal to the cumulative current
account balance plus valuation effects on the initial stock of net assets. Adverse valuation
effects are important during this period, although, as Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) document, they were common across Europe, especially vis-à-vis the United
States. The current account balance in turn equals the balance of trade in goods and services,
plus transfers from abroad, of which the main item is remittances from emigrants. Although
this last item has traditionally been large for Portugal, it played almost no role during the
slump.3
Finally, one can separate Portuguese exports and imports into those within the European
Union and those outside. The table shows that most of the borrowing from abroad came
through trade deficits with the rest of the European Union. The pace at which these deficits
grew is remarkable, especially since Portugal is not particularly open for a country of its
size: exports plus imports were 72 percent of GDP in 2007. During these years Portugal was
receiving one-third more goods and services from abroad than it was sending in return.
Banks were at the center of these capital flows, serving as the intermediary between the
foreigners and Portuguese firms and households. R. Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, and T. Tressel
(2010) estimate that in 2007, banks accounted for approximately half of the Portuguese
foreign debt. Categorizing gross capital flows into equity, foreign direct investment, and
debt, Lane (2013) estimates that between 2003 and 2007, debt accounted for 68 percent of
these flows.
1.3 Competitiveness and the shift to nontradables
As Guillermo Calvo and coauthors (1996) document for the Latin American economies in
the 1990s, large capital inflows typically come with increases in the real exchange rate, that
is, in the ratio of the prices of goods at home to those of goods abroad, expressed in domestic
currency. Table 3 shows that Portugal’s real exchange rate against all its trading partners
as a group rose by almost 12 percent during the slump.
3After the democratic revolution and especially with membership in the European Union, Portugal grad-
ually became a net recipient of migrants from Brazil, the former colonies in Africa, and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, as standards of living increased in the home country, Portuguese emigrants abroad gradually




Table 3. Changes in Exchange Rates and Relative Prices between Portugal and Its Trading 
Partners, 2000-07 
 









Nominal exchange rate 7.70 0 0 
Real exchange rateb 11.91 5.98 4.01 
 Terms of trade 1.33 1.70 -5.74 
 Relative price of nontradablesc 10.58 4.28 9.74 
Value-added measures of pricesd    
 All industries 8.81 10.71 -0.77 
 Manufacturing  2.41 -4.22 
 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a. See table 1 for the countries included. 
b. Real exchange rates are calculated using the consumer price index as the measure of inflation. 
c. Calculated as the residual. 







Another hypothesis for the slump is that on entering monetary union, Portugal set the
exchange rate at which it traded escudos for euros at too high a value. This would explain
the large trade deficit with the rest of the euro area, as Portuguese firms would then have
had difficulty selling their overpriced goods abroad. If this were the case, however, the real
exchange rate should have tended to fall back to its equilibrium level. Yet during the slump
not only did the real exchange rate continue to rise, but it remains today above its 2000
level.
Moreover, as table 3 also shows, of Portugal’s 11.9 percent real appreciation against all
trading partners, 7.7 percentage points is due to a rise in the nominal exchange rate.4 Thus,
even though most of the Portuguese trade deficit occurred in trade within the euro area, the
largest driver of the change in Portugal’s real exchange rate was the appreciation of the euro
relative to other currencies, especially the British pound and the dollar. The other columns
in the table confirm this, by calculating the change in Portugal’s real exchange rate with
the euro area and with Portugal’s three main trading partners, all of which use the euro.
Relative to these trading partners, Portugal’s real appreciation has been modest.
Table 3 also shows a standard decomposition of the change in the real exchange rate
4Let Q be the real exchange rate and E the nominal exchange rate, both defined such that an increase
means an appreciation. Then Q = EP/P ∗, where P and P ∗ are the price indexes at home and abroad,
respectively.
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into the sum of the change in the terms of trade and the change in the relative price of
nontradables as the residual.5 Most of the change in the real exchange rate was due to an
increase in the relative price of Portuguese nontradables.
Yet another hypothesis for the Portuguese slump is that the accession of China to the
World Trade Organization in 2001 introduced a fierce competitor for Portuguese exports, one
that, like Portugal, specialized in exploiting its low wages relative to the richer EU countries.
Although the growing role of China in world markets has left no country unaffected, there
are a few reasons to be skeptical of the Chinese ascent as providing a trade-based explanation
for the Portuguese slump. First, as table 3 shows, Portugal’s terms of trade deteriorated
only slightly during this period. Second, although Portugal’s export share in world markets
declined, those of Spain, Greece, and Italy declined by almost the same amount, yet these
countries avoided Portugal’s slump. Third, it is not clear why Chinese competition would
cause a slump in distant Portugal, at a time when so many other middle-income countries
in Southeast Asia and Latin America were booming. These countries also exported goods
in low-wage sectors, which were likely closer substitutes for Chinese exports than were Por-
tuguese goods.
A more promising avenue to explore is what is behind the increase in the relative price of
nontradables. There are two caveats to measuring this relative price as a residual. First, the
difficulties in measuring both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade may translate into
even greater inaccuracy in measuring their difference. Second, there are important input-
output links between tradables and nontradables in every economy, so that using gross price
deflators does not allow for a proper separation between the relative prices of the two sectors.
The last two rows of table 3 provide an alternative means of decomposition, by using
instead measures of value added both for the whole economy and for manufacturing alone
as a proxy for tradable goods. Relative to the country’s main trading partners, the relative
price of all goods in Portugal actually fell, mostly driven by a large increase in prices in
Spain. More to the point, taking manufacturing as a proxy for the tradables sector, it is
clear that the evidence for uncompetitive Portuguese tradables is slim, whereas the relative
price of nontradables clearly increased against all benchmarks.
Is the increase in Portugal’s prices relative to the euro area due to a Balassa-Samuelson
effect, whereby as Portugal converges in income to the rest of Europe, productivity in the
5Let γ denote the weight of nontradables in the price index, and assume for simplicity that this weight
is constant and the same in the home country and abroad. Then Q = E(PT /P ∗T )
1−γ(PN/P ∗N )
γ , where PT







Table 4. Changes in Sector Composition in Portugal and Its Trading Partners, 2000-06 
 
  Change, 2000-06 (percentage points) 
 









Share in employment     
    Manufacturing 17.74 -2.72 -1.94 -2.14 
    Construction 10.22 -1.33 0.16 0.53 
    Real estate 6.38 0.96 1.40 1.39 
    Community services 24.06 1.12 1.07 0.94 
    Wholesale and retail trade 17.42 1.95 -0.14 -0.28 
Share in value added     
    Manufacturing 14.43 -2.66 -1.34 -2.23 
    Construction 6.61 -1.00 0.37 1.74 
    Real estate 14.59 0.14 0.75 1.91 
    Community services 26.51 2.53 0.11 0.06 
    Wholesale and retail trade 12.85 -0.52 -0.72 -0.63 
 
Sources: See appendix A. 




tradables sector grows, raising wages and the price of nontradables? Angel Estrada, Jordi
Galí, and David Lopez-Salido (forthcoming) argue that this effect can explain little of the
inflation differentials in the euro area. In the case of Portugal, there was no convergence in
income to the euro area during the slump, nor was there any significant productivity growth
in the tradables sector, so it is hard to justify the starting point for this explanation.
1.4 Growth and Decline by Sector
Table 4 turns to the shares of the tradables and nontradables sectors in the Portuguese
economy, to further investigate the consequences of the change in their relative price. Starting
with manufacturing’s share in employment and nominal value added, the table shows their
values in 2006, and the change in both shares from 2000 to 2006. There is a clear decline
in both, which can be associated with a decline in the tradables sector and a corresponding
increase in the nontradables sector. Indeed, growth in the nontradables sector is a distinctive
feature not only of the slump in Portugal, but also of the boom in the other euro crisis
countries (Bento 2010a, Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010).
However, manufacturing has been in relative decline for decades throughout the developed
world as employment shifts toward services. As table 4 also shows, the fall in manufacturing
employment turns out to be only slightly more pronounced in Portugal than in the rest of
the euro area during this period. Moreover, because the relative price of manufactured goods
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has been falling, the decline in manufacturing’s share in nominal output overstates the slight
fall in its real share.
To dig deeper, the rest of the table shows the shares in employment and in value added not
just for manufacturing, but also for the other four largest sectors, all of which are dominated
by nontraded products and services. A unique feature of the Portuguese economy, relative
to the other euro crisis countries, stands out: the construction sector declined significantly,
both relative to other European countries and in absolute terms. Whereas in Spain the
share of value added in construction rose from 8.3 percent to 12.2 percent, in Portugal it
fell from 7.6 percent to 6.6 percent. At the same time, Portugal saw quite large increases
in employment in wholesale and retail trade and in the real output of community services,
particularly in education, health care, and social work. Thus, the growth in nontradables
was uneven across sectors.
1.5 Misallocation of Resources across Sectors
Two conventional inputs into macroeconomic models are the level of productivity and the
extent of competition in the economy. A long literature has measured the first using Robert
Solow’s concept of total factor productivity, and the second using the negative of the log of
the labor income share. Table 5 shows the changes in these measures for Portugal, both for
the overall economy and for the five largest sectors.
Productivity declined during the slump across all sectors. Notably, however, the decline
was largest in real estate and in wholesale and retail trade. Thus, the sector that had em-
ployment grow fastest during the slump, wholesale and retail trade, was also one of the worst
performers in terms of productivity growth. At the same time, even as markups fell across
most industries, they rose in one sector, community services, which had the second-fastest
employment growth. This suggests a misallocation of the resources coming into the country,
as the sectors that grew their employment the most either are relatively unproductive or
have rising rents.
1.6 More Evidence of Misallocation
If the preceding discussion is correct, then the misallocation of resources should not be unique
to the capital inflows since 2000 but should be a steady, salient feature of the Portuguese
economy. There is some evidence that it is so.






Table 5. Changes in Productivity and in Markups in Portugal and Its Trading Partners, by Sector 
 
 







Total factor productivity Annualized growth rate, 2000-05 (percent)!
    All industries -1.85& 0.07& -0.21&
    Manufacturing -0.81& 0.92& 0.63&
    Construction -2.46& -0.60& -0.74&
    Real estate -4.44& -0.76& -0.92&
    Community services -1.77& -0.19& -0.48&
    Wholesale and retail trade -2.96& 0.34& -0.16&
  
Markupsb Average annual change, 2000-06 (percentage points)&
    All industries 0.00& 0.39& 0.84&
    Manufacturing -0.58& 0.31& 0.35&
    Construction -0.93& 1.16& 1.42&
    Real estate -0.49& -1.02& 0.10&
    Community services 0.58& 0.11& 0.29 
    Wholesale and retail trade -1.42& 0.01& 0.13&
Sources: See appendix A. 
a. For the markup measures, euro-area refers to 12 countries, as in table 1. For the total factor productivity panel, the 
euro-area includes only 8 countries: Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
b. The markup for each sector is defined as the negative of the log of the labor share. 
 
 
  bution of Portuguese firms from 1986 to 2009. They find, first, that this distribution is quite
skewed to the left, pronouncedly more than in, for example, Denmark or the United States.
Portugal has many very small firms, even as productivity tends to be higher in medium-size
and larger firms. Second, they find a pronounced shift to the left in the distribution through-
out this period, unlike what is observed in any other country. Changes in data coverage of
the informal sector, or the shift to services, can account at best for half of the shift. Instead,
Braguinsky and coauthors argue, thresholds in labor law impose higher taxes on large than
on small firms, encouraging an inefficiently low equilibrium firm size.
Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (forthcoming) produce cross-sectional distributions
of management practices across firms for different countries. The estimates for Portugal
show a strong left tail of firms that appear to be very poorly managed and unproductive,
but somehow remain in operation year after year.
Eric Bartelsman, John Haltiwanger, and Stefano Scarpetta (2009) have put together a
data set of firm-level productivity estimates for many sectors in many countries. It includes
data on labor productivity for Portugal in the years 1991-94 and 2000, but they focus their
analysis only on the early 1990s. Using their supplementary information, I took the cross-
sectional average of their coefficients of variation of labor productivity across firms, within
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a sector, weighted by firm size. The result is 0.017. The same calculation for Germany
yields a result of 0.002. If one is willing to focus solely on manufacturing, one can also
compare Portugal with France, another of its main trading partners. The average coefficient
of variation for Portugal is 0.023, whereas for France it is 0.013. Using Bartelsman and
others’ (2009) publicly available data for 2000 in Portugal and Germany, I also calculated
this statistic for two important nontradables sectors: construction, which was contracting
in Portugal during the period, and retail trade, which was expanding. I also distinguish
among existing firms, new entrants, and exiting firms. Across all categories, productivity in
Portugal is considerably more dispersed than it is in Germany, and there is no clear pattern
of the dispersion being higher just in the sector that was growing, or just among entering
firms. All considered, this is suggestive evidence that there are many unproductive firms in
operation in Portugal, which do not seem in danger of closing down.
1.7 The Government: Taxes and Old-Age Pensions
Having discussed monetary and exchange rate policy, productivity, and markups, I now turn
to fiscal policy as another usual candidate to explain recessions and slumps. Table 6 shows
the changes in the main fiscal variables over 2000-07.
Portugal’s ratio of public debt to GDP rose substantially during the 7 years of the slump,
especially relative to the other countries in Europe. In this regard Portugal is close to Greece
during this period. However, unlike Greece, this increase in public debt came during a period
of economic stagnation and rapidly rising unemployment. It would therefore be surprising if
the debt had not increased. For comparison, in the United States in the 4 years since 2008,
the unemployment rate increased by less than in Portugal during its slump, yet federal debt
held by the public, relative to GDP, increased in the United States by twice as much as in
Portugal.
The data on the components of the fiscal deficit confirm the impression that the period
was not marked by fiscal profligacy. Taxes increased significantly, both on consumption and
on labor income, even as they were falling in most of the euro area. Moreover, the decline in
interest rates ensured that although the debt was growing, interest payments were roughly
constant. The rise in debt was therefore driven by increases in spending and, as has become
the norm in developed countries (Oh and Reis 2012), the bulk of it was in social transfers. It
is difficult to see signs of large increases in discretionary spending in the data. Not only did






Table 6. Public Finances in Portugal and Its Trading Partners, 2000-07 
 











Government debt as share of GDP 68.27 17.87 -2.90 -8.70 
Taxes as share of GDP     
 Total 32.80 1.70 -0.90 0.56 
 On consumption 12.60 0.80 -0.40 -0.47 
 On labor 12.40 0.90 -1.20 -0.46 
 On capital 7.80 -0.10 0.60 1.44 
Government spending as share of GDP     
 Total 44.4 2.8 -0.1 -0.3 
 Purchases 22.54 -0.53 0.32 0.61 
 Social protection 15.30 3.30 -0.40 -0.22 
  Old age 9.30 3.20 n.a. 0.05 
     
Memoranda:     
Percent of the population older than 65 17.25 1.22 1.59 1.12 
Pensioners as percent of the labor force 59.00 3.40 n.a.& n.a.&
Effective average retirement age (years) 66.32 2.50 n.a. 0.49 
 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a. See table 1 for the countries included; n.a. = not available. 
 
  More than 100 percent of the increase in total spending comes from a single subcategory
of social protection spending: old-age pensions. The last three rows of table 6 show some
relevant statistics. Portugal’s population is aging, but not at a faster rate than in other
European countries, and the retirement age actually increased during the slump. Thus, the
source of this higher spending was not more retirees, but rather more generous pensions.
One can identify two channels through which the system’s generosity worked (Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2009). First, because Portugal
has one of the highest rates of old-age poverty in the OECD, it addresses this social concern
by having a minimum pension for everyone. The combination of population aging and the
slump implied large increases in spending in this antipoverty aspect of the public pension
system. Second, the expansions in the generosity of the system occurred in the early 1990s,
especially for public servants. It was during 2000-07 that these past promises came due, and
spending rose. Notably, in 2000 and 2002, pension reforms that tried to curtail this increase
in spending were mostly unsuccessful, and only in 2007 was a more significant reform en-
acted, which indexed the retirement age to life expectancy and lowered the net replacement
rate for the median worker to 73 percent. Thus, the more promising candidate in the fis-
cal domain to explain the slump is the hike in labor and consumption taxes to fund past
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promises to pensioners.
1.8 Changes in the Portuguese Labor Market
A familiar mantra about the Portuguese labor market is that it is highly rigid, with strong
restrictions on firing and generous unemployment insurance. By the OECD’s measures of
employment protection, Portugal in 2000 had the second most rigid labor market in a sample
of 28 countries. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) estimate low quarterly rates of job creation
and destruction in Portugal between 1983 and 1995 and convincingly argue that these were
due to high levels of employment protection.
Thus, another hypothesis to explain the slump is that even small adverse shocks may
have been compounded through the rigidity of the labor market. However, the labor market
in Portugal has changed significantly since 2000. M. Pereira (2012) documents the numerous
reforms of unemployment insurance since 2000, all of which have made it considerably less
generous.
Much the same can be said about restrictions on firing. Labor law reforms have made
it easier to sign temporary contracts, which have a fixed term after which the worker can
be easily let go at little cost. In 2007 temporary employment was 22 percent of Portuguese
employment, against an EU-21 average of 15 percent and an OECD average of 12 percent.6
Among workers aged 15-24, who entered the labor market recently and so were not covered
by outstanding permanent contracts, 52 percent are on temporary contracts, against averages
of 43 percent and 26 percent for the EU-21 and the OECD, respectively. Using detailed job
flows data, M. Centeno and A. Novo (2012) estimate that between 2002 and 2006, 85 percent
of all Portuguese workers leaving unemployment went into a temporary job, and that the
share of temporary contracts was particularly large in firms expanding employment. The
OECD’s index of employment protection of temporary workers in 2008 ranks Portugal only
12th out of 40 sampled countries.
The gap between worker flows in Portugal and in the United States is also significantly
smaller today than in the earlier estimates of Blanchard and Portugal (2001). Centeno,
Novo, and C. Machado (2007) estimate that for 2001-07, the average quarterly rates of
job creation and job destruction in Portugal were 5.3 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively;
both figures are 1.9 percentage points lower than for the United States during the same
period. The annual job turnover rate in Portugal was 25.1 percent, very close to the U.S.
6The EU-21, defined by the OECD, includes all EU countries prior to May 2004, plus the four eastern
European member countries of the OECD, namely Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic.
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level. Alexandre and others (2010) estimate that between 2003 and 2009, the job turnover
rate among workers on temporary contracts was 44 percent, compared with 19 percent for
permanent contracts.
All combined, the Portuguese labor market since 2000 is best described as a dual market
(Centeno and Novo 2012). Most workers still have permanent contracts, and are thus highly
protected. This has an effect on average productivity and may well be one of the crucial rea-
sons behind Portugal’s productivity and income gap relative to the rest of Europe. However,
in adjusting to macroeconomic shocks like the 2000-07 slump, the relevant marginal worker,
the one who is hired or fired to adjust to changes in demand, is on a temporary contract,
which is relatively flexible.
1.9 The Takeaway
In 2000-07 Portugal went through a slump in production and employment, in spite of large
capital inflows and low long-term interest rates that modestly raised real wages and the real
exchange rate. The relative prices of most nontradables sectors rose, yet the expansion in em-
ployment and value added was concentrated in wholesale and retail trade and in community
services, while construction prominently contracted. Worryingly, wholesale and retail trade
was also the sector with the second largest relative decline in productivity, and community
services was the only sector with an increase in estimates of markups. This suggests that an
explanation for the Portuguese slump is that the large inflows of capital were misallocated
across sectors of the economy, causing the observed fall in the growth of productivity.
This account leaves a few questions open. First, how were the resources misallocated,
and why did this happen in the 2000s in the nontradables sector? Second, how does the
misallocation translate into low measured TFP? And third, what was special about Portugal
that led it to experience a slump even as Ireland and Spain boomed? To make progress on
these questions, one needs a model that separately identifies some of these mechanisms and
spells out what assumptions are required to make the account hold together. The next
section takes on this challenge.
2 A Model of Misallocation of Foreign Capital Inflows
The theoretical literature on sudden stops (for example, Mendoza 2006) has already spelled
out the mechanism by which an increase in capital flows can lead to a reallocation from the
tradables to the nontradables sector. Gabriel Fagan and Vitor Gaspar (2007) provide one of
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the first applications of these ideas to the euro area experience. A fall in the interest rate
at which a country can borrow from abroad causes a consumption boom and large capital
inflows to finance it, so that net foreign assets fall. The higher consumption of tradables
is sustained through imports, whereas nontradables must be produced domestically. This
requires a reallocation of inputs into the nontradables sector, and with it an increase in
employment in that sector, an increase in real wages, and a real appreciation.
This description fits the Portuguese slump well, with one important exception: there was
no boom in consumption or output. Gianluca Benigno and Luca Fornaro (2012) introduce
an additional mechanism to explain stagnant output. They assume that technology in the
tradables sector improves through learning by doing, so that the reallocation of factors of
production away from this sector causes productivity growth to fall. This can account for the
fall in measured TFP during the slump. However, productivity in Portugal’s nontradables
sector also stagnated, whereas their model would predict that it would be unchanged, or
perhaps slightly accelerate if there is some learning by doing in this sector as well.
I present an alternative model that focuses on the misallocation of resources across sec-
tors, especially within nontradables. I make simplifying assumptions that shut off the two
mechanisms I just described, not because they are not important, but so as to focus on the
facts that they fail to explain. I anticipate that combining them would provide a working
comprehensive model of the behavior of the euro crisis countries in 2000-07.
I present the model in blocks. I start with a model, inspired by Kosuke Aoki, Benigno,
and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (2010), of domestic credit market frictions that lead resources to be
misallocated across firms. Next, I present a model of capital inflows from abroad that, inter-
acting with domestic frictions, can lower productivity. Philippe Aghion, Philippe Bacchetta,
and Abhijit Banerjee (2004) and Ricardo Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2001) are
important precursors. Third, I present a simple model of labor supply to make the conven-
tional case that higher taxes will depress economic activity, and a standard model of the
allocation of inputs between the tradables and the nontradables sectors.
2.1 Credit Markets and the Misallocation of Capital
For simplicity, I assume that the nontradables sector produces a single good produced by
a continuum of entrepreneurs, each with her own production function with productivity
drawn from the set [0, a¯]. If resources were allocated perfectly, only the entrepreneur with
the highest productivity, a¯, would be in business. It is a symptom of misallocated resources
when some of the nontradable good is produced by any other entrepreneur, leading to average
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TFP below a¯.
In the model such misallocation happens because of imperfect financial markets. Each
entrepreneur draws at date t its productivity at from the distribution G(a). For simplicity, I
assume these draws are i.i.d. and that they are the only source of uncertainty in the economy.







subject to an intertemporal budget constraint,









t − wtnt + dt − bt.
On the left-hand side of this equation are consumption ct (bought at price pt), investment in
capital that will be productive next period kt, investment in a financial institution dt+1 with
return rt, and borrowing bt+1 to finance production at interest rate rbt . On the right-hand
side is the revenue from production, specified using a Cobb-Douglas production function that
combines labor nt and capital to generate the nontradable good, which sells for price pNt .
With this revenue plus whatever financial investments she has made, the entrepreneur must
pay her workers at wage rate wt and repay her financiers from the last period. Capital fully
depreciates after one period. To make the words “borrowing” and “investing” substantive,
the following constraints hold: dt+1 ≥ 0, bt+1 ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0.
Without any further constraints, the most productive entrepreneur would borrow to
invest in the optimal amount of capital, while all others would save in the financial markets,
providing the funds for this borrowing. The friction that prevents this efficient allocation of
resources is a collateral constraint. Each entrepreneur can pledge only an amount θ of her










I assume that θ < 1 and that this constraint will bind for the most productive entrepreneur,
who is thus unable to raise all the capital needed to supply the efficient amount of the good.
The parameter θ captures limits to credit in the model but can be more broadly inter-
preted as standing in for a general misallocation of resources across firms, within and across
subsectors of the nontradables sector, that prevents the most efficient firms from grow-
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ing. It could also refer to government regulations, inefficiency of the judicial system, or the
cartelization of sectors by a few large economic groups with privileged access to policymakers
or protection from regulators.
Appendix B solves this problem. Because in equilibrium, rt ≥ rbt , if an entrepreneur is
active in production, she will borrow up to the constraint. This allows her to earn a leveraged
return, Rt, which rises with the price of the good relative to the labor cost to produce it,
pNt /wt, and with the entrepreneur’s productivity at−1 relative to the cost of borrowing rbt−1.
Entrepreneurs sort themselves into two groups, depending on whether their productivity
is above or below a threshold a∗t . Those with low productivity do not produce and instead
use their net worth to invest in financial assets, earning rt. Those with higher productivity
produce and borrow to the point where their collateral constraint binds, earning Rt. An
economy with an underdeveloped financial market therefore suffers from two inefficiencies
in production. On the extensive margin, many inefficient firms are in operation, so a∗t < a¯.
On the intensive margin, the most efficient entrepreneur produces below the efficient scale,
since she can only borrow up to a multiple of her net worth.
This simple model of capital misallocation can capture the relevant features of the Por-
tuguese economy highlighted in section 1. There are many small firms, most of which are very
unproductive. Because the country is still accumulating capital in its convergence process,
the net worth of entrepreneurs is small, and the production of the most efficient firms will be




which increases with a∗t . A shock that causes a∗t to fall lowers measured productivity.
2.2 Capital Inflows and the Expansion of Nontradables
Most Portuguese firms, especially in the nontradables sector, do not have access to inter-
national financial markets. Lacking expertise in the local market, foreigners must channel
their capital investments through the domestic financial system. In the model, a competitive
financial sector receives funds from inactive entrepreneurs and foreigners and channels them
to the entrepreneurs that are in business. This sector is the only one that can make loans,
because it is the only one that can seize collateral from failing entrepreneurs. One can think
of the collateral parameter θ as their technology, so that underdeveloped credit markets are
synonymous in the model with an inefficient financial sector.
Financing from abroad comes at an exogenous interest rate, rf . However, the financial
sector can secure funding only by offering as collateral a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of its loans.7 The
7Because the loans are to the nontradables sector, one could adopt the following technological interpreta-
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with a Production Threshold for Nontradables Firms
                                 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   














parameter φ measures the integration of the country into capital markets. An increase in φ
comes with an influx of foreign capital into the country.










As long as φ < 1, since rt > rf , one can see that rt > rbt as I assumed earlier. Combining
this equation with the threshold for an entrepreneur to be active in production gives a firm-
selection curve, depicted in figure 2. If the interest rate paid to inactive entrepreneurs is
higher, the interest rate charged on loans must rise with a competitive financial sector. As
this lowers the leveraged return that producers can earn, more entrepreneurs choose to stay
inactive, leading to an increase in the threshold for production. The firm-selection curve
therefore is upward sloping.
In equilibrium, domestic investment in the financial sector must fund a share 1−φ of the
loans. This market-clearing condition gives a downward-sloping relationship between rt and
tion of this constraint: banks have access to a technology that allows them to transform nontradable seized
collateral into tradable output, the only kind that foreigners are willing to accept, at transformation rate φ.
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a∗t , denoted in figure 2 by the market-clearing line. Intuitively, if fewer entrepreneurs are
active and need financing, so that a∗t is higher, then fewer loans are made, which lowers the
demand for deposits and so lowers the interest rate rt that banks must pay. The intersection
of the two schedules gives the unique equilibrium for a∗t and rt.
The introduction of the euro removed exchange rate risk for European investors investing
in Portugal. Moreover, in its main refinancing operations, the European Central Bank (ECB)
started accepting as collateral the bonds of many Portuguese public companies, providing a
new source of funds. More generally, the monetary union actively promoted the integration of
capital markets in Europe, making foreigners more willing to supply funds to the Portuguese
economy. Therefore, I take the capital inflow shock to correspond to an increase in φ.
A higher φ shifts both schedules in figure 2 to the left: for a fixed rt, it lowers rbt , increasing
the leveraged returns to firms and shifting the firm-selection curve; for a fixed rbt , it lowers
rt, so fewer entrepreneurs wish to invest their funds in the financial system, and the market-
clearing curve shifts. Unambiguously, a∗t falls; that is, more entrepreneurs start producing.
After 2000, capital from the rest of Europe flowed into Portugal, lowering domestic saving
while expanding leverage. Many inefficient firms in the nontradables sector could now obtain
financing, so they went into business. Measured TFP fell, and in a simple extension of the
model with multiple sectors, it fell the most in those sectors where the expansion was largest,
because more unproductive firms entered the market.
Meanwhile, along the intensive margin, the most productive firms do not expand because
they are against their collateral constraint, and they may even contract if the price of the
nontradable good falls. The euro and the integration of European capital markets did not
significantly improve the ability of the domestic financial sector to allocate capital: financial
integration did not lead to financial deepening. In terms of the model, φ rose but θ did not
change. Therefore, the most productive firms were unable to access the newly abundant
funds.
2.3 The Tradables Sector and Taxes
The consumption basket in the economy is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the nontradable
good and a tradable good, with expenditure shares γ and 1−γ, respectively. The price of the
tradable good-the terms of trade-is normalized to 1, and the good is supplied competitively
using a Cobb-Douglas technology that is identical to that for nontradables but has a TFP of
A. The owner of this technology is a representative household, who also supplies the labor
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The aggregate consumption of the household is Cˆt, while they supply all of the labor in the
economy Lt, and ψ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Labor income is
taxed at rate τ , with the proceeds rebated to the household every period. This is the only
form of fiscal policy that I consider, since section 1 concluded that an increase in these taxes
was the major change in fiscal policy during the slump.
The budget constraint of the households is similar to that of the entrepreneurs, but they
do not need to use the local financial system. Because they produce tradable goods, they can
pledge their output to foreigners, and for simplicity I assume they can do so fully. Therefore,
all of the production of tradables can be financed using funds from abroad, and the change
in financial integration does not affect this sector directly. This is, of course, an extreme
assumption, but the important premise for the misallocation hypothesis of the Portuguese
slump is only that the nontradables sector is less financially deep than the tradables sector,
and so more affected by an influx of new funds from abroad.
Three important results come out of this model of household behavior and production
of tradables. First, because there are constant returns to scale in production, the condition
of zero profits in the tradables sector requires that the wage rate for the overall economy is
pinned down by the foreign real interest rate rf . This extreme property makes the model
quite tractable and is not too dissimilar from the relative stagnation of real compensation
discussed in section 1. It also implies that changes in the interest rate at which Portugal
finances itself abroad have a direct impact on output. This will be important for under-
standing the crash after 2007.
Second, higher taxes lower after-tax wages and immediately discourage labor supply.
Therefore, the increase in taxes in Portugal to finance old-age pension commitments, dis-
cussed in section 1, will have played a part in lowering output during the slump. The next
section asks whether this effect is large.
Third, a condition for the model economy to be credit constrained is that entrepreneurs
earn a return above the foreign interest rate; for the economy to be in steady state, this
requires that β < 1/rf . As a result, the household has no savings and lives hand to mouth
using foreign capital to finance the production of tradables. This is an extreme result, due
to the simplicity of the model, but the key fact that is captured is that the tradables sector
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has better access to external financing. This result implies that when capital flows from
abroad, it goes into the nontradables sector. Because that sector competes for labor with
the tradables sector, financial integration implies a relative decline in the production of
tradables, as well as an increase in the price of nontradables, driving a real appreciation.
3 Further application of the model to the data
The model’s predictions in section 2 appeared to fit almost all of the facts about the Por-
tuguese economy described in section 1. This section explores this match further in three
ways. The first is by solving the model and verifying whether the partial-equilibrium in-
tuition in section 2 survives in general equilibrium. I also ask how far the misallocation
hypothesis can explain the slump quantitatively. The second is by asking whether the model
can explain why Ireland and Spain boomed during this period, even though they also saw
an expansion in nontradables, current account deficits, and a real appreciation. The third is
by investigating the role that taxes play in conjunction with the misallocation channel.
The appendix describes the nonlinear algorithm that solves the model without any ap-
proximation. The entire model, from steady state to the responses to shocks, takes a couple
of seconds to solve, as long as I assume that the distribution of nontradables productivity
G(a) is uniform, which I will.8 The model is too simple to seriously calibrate to the data, so
instead I set parameter values to reasonable values based on the literature. In particular, I
take the time period to be 4 years, so that I can abstract from nominal rigidities and make
more plausible the assumption that firm-level productivity is i.i.d. I set rf = 1.08, for an
annualized real interest rate of 2 percent, which matches the average during this period, and
β = 0.84 for a steady-state return on capital that is twice as large. I set α = 0.3, γ = 0.5, and
ψ = 1, to match standard business-cycle values for the capital share, the weight of tradables,
and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively. The top productivity
for nontradables is a¯ = 1, so that one can interpret 1− a∗t as the share of projects that are
funded, and the parameter A determines only average hours worked. Finally, for the initial
value of τ , I use the values in table 6, which imply that the average effective tax on working
was 20.8 percent in 2000.
The two most important parameters for the misallocation hypothesis are θ, the degree
of financial deepening, and φ, the degree of financial integration. Insofar as these proxy
8If instead I assume that a1/α is uniform, the model can still be solved with pencil and paper. Outside
of these cases, one would have to numerically solve an integral.
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for general misallocation, it is hard to pin down their values. An active research literature,
surveyed in D. Restuccia and R. Rogerson (2013), tries to measure them across countries,
but no definite conclusions have been reached. Here I take a very simple back-of-the-envelope
approach. Since θ is the share of capital investment by the entrepreneurs that comes from
outside sources, I set it equal to the share of bank financing of nonfinancial corporations.
That value fluctuated in Portugal from the mid-1990s to 2007 between 0.2 and 0.3, so I set
it to 0.25. As for φ, recall the basic national income accounting identity that gross saving
minus the current account balance must equal gross investment. In the model φ measures
the share of investment coming from abroad. Because before the slump, Portugal had close
to balanced external accounts, I set φ to 0 before the slump.
3.1 The Impact of Financial Integration
From 2000 onward, capital inflows to Portugal were very large. Calculating φ as the average
of the ratio of the current account deficit to gross investment for the period 2000-07 gives
a new value of approximately 0.35. I therefore simulate the model for the case where φ
unexpectedly increases by 0.35, starting from a steady state. Figure 3 shows the path of




Table 7. Impact of Financial Integration on Output under Different Scenariosa 
 
 Change in extent of financial integration ϕ 
 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 
Output on impact 1.007 0.989 0.990 0.991 0.992 
Output in steady state 0.978 0.998 0.978 0.978 0.978 
      
 Level of financial deepening θ 
 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 
Output on impact 0.990 1.031 1.003 1.009 1.013 
Output in steady state 0.978 1.020 0.988 0.992 1.002 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the model described in the text. 
a. Output is set equal to 1.0 in period 0.  
 
 The model is able to generate a sizable slump in economic activity. As capital flows into
the nontradables sector, a∗t falls as more lower-productivity firms are financed, leading to
a fall in average productivity. At the same time, labor is drawn away from the tradables
sector, lowering its output. Because the relative price of nontradables rises, some of the
more efficient nontradables firms can expand, so output may rise or fall. For the baseline
parameters, it barely moves initially but then falls significantly.
Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of the change in output to the size of the shock. I
vary the increase in φ and report the resulting change in output, both on impact and in the
new steady state. If financial integration is even more intense, GDP can fall by as much
as 2.2 percent. These are rough estimates, but they suggest that there is potential for the
misallocation channel to make financial integration lead to slumps.
3.2 Other Countries
A successful model of the Portuguese slump should also be able to account for what was
happening in Ireland and Spain at the same time. These economies are sufficiently similar
in their structure, and in 2000-07 all of them experienced large capital inflows, an expansion
of nontradables, a real appreciation, and a decline in productivity growth. However, unlike
Portugal, they all boomed during these years.
One difference relative to Ireland and Spain is that Portugal has a less developed financial
system, and judging from the cross-sectional distribution of productivity and management
practices across firms, it also likely has more misallocation of capital. In the model this
would be captured by a higher θ. Ireland and Spain would then have a higher starting a∗t , so
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they would be more productive than the Portuguese economy to start with and have more
efficient firms operating at a larger scale.
Table 7 shows the impact of financial integration on output when financial markets are
deeper, by increasing θ from the Portuguese value of 0.25. Now, when the capital market
integrates with the introduction of the euro and φ increases, there is still a fall in TFP in
all cases, due to the expansion of the nontradables sector. The model can also still explain
the real appreciation, the current account deficits, and most of the other facts shared by
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. However, with deeper financial markets, there is now a larger
increase in the capital employed by the more efficient firms, and a smaller rate of entry
of unproductive firms. Output in the nontradables sector booms, at the expense of the
tradables sector, and the economy booms as well.
The joint lesson from this and the previous section is that if the increase in φ is accom-
panied by an increase in θ, output and welfare will rise. That is, according to the model,
a slump is the result of financial integration without financial deepening. If the economy is
already more financially developed, or can become so as it opens capital markets to foreign
funds, then prosperity will result.
3.3 The Role of Taxes
Section 1 also showed that taxes rose in Portugal during the period of the slump. Faced with
the need to keep up with rapidly rising expenditure on pensions, the government raised the
effective tax on working by 1.4 percentage points through increases in consumption and labor
taxes. Figure 3 shows the impact of the rise in taxes, modeled as an unexpected permanent
change. As one would expect, the slump is now deeper: the model can generate a fall in
output of almost 4 percent.
The increase in the average tax rate likely understates the increase in the marginal tax
rate. If the marginal rate increased by twice the average rate, the fall in output would be
as much as 5.6 percent. At the same time, I assume a value of 1 for the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, standard in the macro literature and which is consistent with the micro
evidence that takes into account the extensive margin, but the findings in the literature are
also consistent with an elasticity of 0.5 (Chetty 2012). When the calculations are repeated
with this lower elasticity, output in steady state falls less now, by 2.8 percent.
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4 The Boom before the Slump, and the Crash after
Because the slump between 2000 and 2007 is what makes the Portuguese case distinctive
and puzzling, it has been the main focus of this paper so far. The period immediately before
the slump, between 1995 and 2000, is also interesting because by then Portugal’s adoption
of the euro was already very likely, and some of its consequences were already being felt.
Section 4.1 discusses this period in light of the data and the model. Section 4.2 then looks
at the period from 2007 until the present, when Portugal was one of several countries in
Europe going through a deep crisis. Again I present the main facts and use the model to
shed light on them. Other, complementary accounts of the euro crisis have been offered into
which Portugal fits naturally, and I discuss these in section 4.3.
4.1 The Boom of 1995-99
Between 1995 and 2000, Portuguese real GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 3.8
percent, which was 1.7 percentage points faster than the average in what was to become
the euro area. Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi (2002) note that this rapid growth was
likely a result of the launch of European monetary union in 1994. With every passing year
it became more likely that Portugal would be an original member of the euro area, and
Portuguese long-term interest rates gradually fell, as shown in figure 4. The current account
gradually went into deficit, as Portugal could now borrow at more favorable terms than it
had in decades.
These facts did not seem surprising. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) highlight that, in
standard open-economy models, a fall in the foreign real interest rate rf should naturally
cause a temporary boom and a current account deficit. However, writing a few years later,
Fagan and Gaspar (2005) raise the question of why, after the initial boom, Portugal did not
experience a gradual growth slowdown and convergence to a new, higher level of income, but
instead entered a slump.
The change that this paper has highlighted is that whereas the shock in 1995 was a
reduction in the foreign real interest rate, from 2000 onward the gradual integration of
European capital markets relaxed foreign borrowing constraints. The ECB allowed banks
to pledge a variety of securities, including many nontradable utilities bonds, as collateral
against its euro repurchase agreements. Portuguese banks, which until then had funded
themselves abroad almost exclusively through the interbank market, were now able to place
bonds with foreign investors.
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Figure 5 simulates the model after a sequence of unexpected shocks. This is not entirely
satisfactory, as many of these changes were at least partly anticipated, but it gives a first
pass at understanding the dynamics predicted by the model. In period 1 the foreign real
interest rate rf falls by 4 percentage points, or 1 percentage point per year, as in Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2002) and Fagan and Gaspar (2005). Then, in period 2, financial integration
occurs, with an increase in φ by 0.35 and an increase in taxes by 1.4% as in the previous
section. Approximately 8 years, or two model periods, after the first shock, the foreign real
interest rate increases by 2 percentage points per year, to capture the jump in the data in
figure 4.
The model captures the boom as well as the slump. It underpredicts the intensity of
both of these, but it gets a long way in doing so. The model also predicts a sudden and steep
crash in 2008-12. Because the sudden hike in foreign interest rates comes after a period of
financial integration, foreign debt is high, and many firms close down once credit becomes
more expensive. Therefore, the sudden stop has a larger impact than it would otherwise
have had.
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4.2 The Crash
In 2008 and 2009 most of the developed world was in a recession, making it difficult to sepa-
rate the global shock from Portugal’s crisis. If anything, the Portuguese economy contracted
less during those 2 years than the euro area as a whole. In January 2010, however, interest
rates on long-term Portuguese government bonds started rising, a few months after the same
thing had happened in Greece.
Between 2003 and 2009, interest rates on Portugal’s10-year bonds had hovered between
3.2 and 5.0 percent, but during 2010 they rose from 3.9 percent to 6.5 percent. Public
spending also rose markedly, partly because of the automatic stabilizers, and partly because
the government, which had won reelection in September 2009, implemented a campaign
promise of raising public sector wages after years of zero increases. By the end of March
2011, 10-year interest rates were at 7.8 percent, and banks were reporting serious difficulties
rolling over their international funding. The prime minister asked for external assistance,
and a troika of the IMF, the European Commission, and the ECB approved a memorandum
of understanding with the Portuguese government in May in exchange for a rescue loan. The
government resigned, and elections in June led to a change in the party in power. Only by
January 2013 did the 10-year interest rate again fall below 7 percent.
In terms of the model, one can think of this shock as an unexpected increase in rf . Risk
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premiums rose on most asset classes around the world after the global crisis. This effect was
larger in Europe, in part because of the financial instability and political uncertainty over
whether and how the sovereign bonds of the periphery countries might default (Lane 2012).
As figure 5 showed, the model predicts that such a financial shock will cause a steep drop in
output, as capital inflows sharply decline, affecting especially the nontradables sector. All
of this occurred in Portugal starting in 2010.
Figure 6 shows the trajectory of capital flows during this period. The top two lines plot
its time series (net foreign assets) and the cumulative current account balance. In 2008 and
2009 the country continued to run large current account deficits and to accumulate a growing
foreign debt. Since the start of 2010, however, the foreign debt has been stable. For most of
that year, positive valuation effects offset the current account deficit, but by the end of 2012
Portugal had a balanced current account and no capital inflows. That is an extraordinarily
sudden stop of capital flowing into the country in the space of 2 years.
The other three lines in the figure break down these capital flows into those flowing
through the central bank, those to the government, and those to the private sector. During
the slump and into 2008, most capital inflows were private. During 2009, however, private
capital inflows stagnated, and all of the new capital came in through the balances in TAR-
GET2, the Eurosystem’s interbank payments system. Once the troika rescue was in place,
transfers from the monetary authority were replaced by loans to the government. From the
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middle of 2011 onward, private flows left the country en masse, to an extent comparable to
the deepest sudden-stop episodes in Latin America in the last two decades.
As in the Latin American cases, this sudden stop of capital inflows has resulted in a deep
recession in Portugal. From its peak in 2010Q3 to the present, quarterly real GDP has fallen
by 10.6 percent, according to the latest available figures (2013Q1), and the unemployment
rate is at 17.7 percent. However, whereas the collapse in the Latin American countries
was often followed by a quick recovery (Calvo and others 2006), the Portuguese economy
shows no signs of resuming growth. The policies usually associated with these "phoenix
miracles" have not been present in Portugal: there have been no significant writedowns on
the external debt, and monetary policy has been tight, with no nominal depreciation of the
euro or significant inflation.
4.3 Further Ingredients of the Crash: Banks, Austerity, and Wages
Because Portugal’s banks were at the center of the capital flows—and in 2010 accounted
for approximately half of the net foreign debt—they were the most affected by the capital
reversal. As part of the troika package, three of the four largest banks have been recapitalized
with public funds. Two characteristics of Portuguese banks are shared with other European
banks, but not with their American counterparts. First, the principal Portuguese banks are
very large relative to the size of the economy. In 2008, the largest Portuguese bank, Banco
Comercial Português, had liabilities equal to 54% of GDP of the whole country (Demigurc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), and its share price since then fell from above 70 cents at the start
of 2008 to less than 10 cents since 2012. As a result, when a severe banking crisis occurs, the
ability of the already revenue-strapped government to rescue the banks comes seriously into
question. Second, Portuguese banks hold large amounts of Portuguese government securities.
In the December 2010 European Banking Authority stress tests, the exposure of Portuguese
banks to Portuguese government debt was estimated at 23 percent of their assets. As a
result of these features, sovereigns and banks in Europe are joined at the hip: the correlation
between credit default swap spreads for sovereigns and banks is close to 1 (Mody and Sandri
2012).
As Maurice Obstfeld (2013) emphasizes, the euro crisis is at its heart a financial crisis.
Markus Brunnermeier and coauthors (2011) argue that the sudden panics and run-ups in
sovereign bond yields in Portugal and elsewhere were the consequence of a "diabolic loop"
between banks and sovereigns. Fears about the solvency of a sovereign put the solvency
of banks in that country at risk, since banks typically hold so much of their assets in the
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sovereign debt of their country. But should the banks fail, the government’s net spending
will increase, either directly because of the need for a bailout, or indirectly because of the
recessionary impact of the banking crisis. Either way the initial fears are confirmed, and the
economy may easily fall to a lower equilibrium. Reis (2013) puts forward a simple model of
this mechanism.
The left-hand panel of figure 7 plots Portuguese public sector revenue and spending and
the stock of public debt from 2008 through 2012; the right-hand panel does the same for
the public deficit. In 2011 there was a serious consolidation of public finances, with the first
reduction in the ratio of spending to GDP in more than 20 years and a primary deficit close
to zero. Yet as GDP fell in 2012, the consequent fall in revenue drove an increase in the
deficit, and the debt at the end of 2012 was 123.6 percent of GDP, well above the objective
of 111.8 percent set out in the first review of the memorandum of understanding with the
troika. Much ink has been spilled over the dilemma faced by a country in this situation: on
the one hand, a country suffering a run on its debt must have a credible plan to lower its
public deficit, while on the other hand implementing fiscal austerity prolongs the recession.
Structural reform was also part of the agenda. The memorandum of understanding
with the troika listed 223 separate reforms for Portugal to undertake, covering most areas
of government intervention. The six reviews of the program so far have agreed that most
have been implemented on schedule. To take one striking example, Portugal had the 2nd-
highest OECD employment protection index in 2000, the 7th highest by 2009, and with all
the implemented reforms, it is forecasted to be in the 13th spot in 2012 (IMF 2013). The
crisis has forced reforms that had been necessary but politically infeasible before (Fernandez-
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Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 2013).
Given the large increase in unemployment, one would expect to see a large decline in
wages. Yet since the beginning of 2010, average nominal compensation per employee has
fallen by less than 2 percent, and unit labor costs by 4 to 6 percent. An example of these
nominal wage rigidities is illustrative: on net, one-third of the jobs in the construction sector
were destroyed between 2006 and 2012. Yet although approximately 170,000 workers are
now without a job, nominal wages in the sector are fixed by collective bargaining and have
not fallen a single cent. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) show that these rigidities deepen
the recession following a sudden stop.
5 Conclusion and policy options
The events in the Portuguese economy since 2000 have been troubling. Like many countries
before it, Portugal went through a gradual increase in capital inflows, starting in 1995 and
intensifying after 2000. Although initially these capital flows led to a boom, as they had
in other countries before, they triggered a slump from 2000 onward. I suggested that this
happened because most of the capital inflows funded unproductive firms in the nontradables
sector, causing economy-wide productivity to fall and the real exchange rate to rise, and
taking resources away from the tradables sector. Meanwhile, generous past promises on old-
age pensions led to continuous increases in taxes, which discouraged work and aggravated the
slump. As the country quickly became financially integrated with the rest of the euro area,
net foreign borrowing rose, leaving it particularly exposed to the financial crisis that came
at the end of the decade. After 2010, a sudden stop in capital flows plunged the country
into a crash.
What could policy have done about this? Taking as given that Portugal wanted to join
the euro and achieve monetary and financial union with the rest of Europe, the account in
this paper still suggests a few policy options. First, according to the model, actively fighting
the creation of rents in the nontradables sector, as suggested by Bento (2010a), would have
improved capital allocation. Enforcing greater competition would have been one way to do
so, and a more direct approach might have been to slow down public investment in those
sectors.
Second, more prudential financial regulation could have curtailed the sudden increase in
foreign borrowing. One possibility would have been to impose and enforce limits on leverage
in the financial sector. More generally, the model suggests that if policymakers foresee a
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period of rapid financial integration, they should focus their energy on promoting financial
deepening in their country.
Third, the absence of fiscal profligacy should not serve to excuse Portugal’s management
of its public finances. An earlier reform of old-age pensions, other cuts in spending programs,
and less distortionary tax increases would have been potentially more effective ways to deal
with the pensions problem.
I have emphasized throughout the paper the similarities between the events in Portugal
and those occurring contemporaneously in Greece, Ireland, and Spain as well as the simi-
larities with the sudden stops that many other countries have suffered through in the last
three decades. The singularity of the Portuguese slump provides some new data that future
research might use to improve our understanding of these pervasive phenomena, leading to
better policy responses in the future.
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The data for the calculations in this paper come mostly from three sources: the OECD
Economic Outlook, the AMECO database of the European Commission (and sometimes
Eurostat directly), and the KLEMS project (www.euklems.net) by O’Mahony and Timmer
(2009). More recent data not in those databases come directly from the Banco de Portugal
and the Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
Figure 1: The Portuguese series is real GDP per capita from AMECO, the U.S. series
is series GDPA in the FRED database (Federal Reserve Economic Data, from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis) divided by population from the Census Bureau, and the Japanese
series is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Table 1: The data on interest rates are series IRL with interest on government bonds,
from the OECD; all other series are from AMECO.
Table 2: The value for net foreign assets comes from the updated and extended version
of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) on the wealth of nations (www.
philiplane.org/EWN.html), the current account and trade account balances are from the
OECD, and the number for trade outside the European Union is from AMECO.
Table 3: The real and nominal exchange rates are calculated by the OECD. The terms
of trade with respect to all trading partners are measured by Eurostat in AMECO; for
the terms of trade of the euro area and the main trading partners, I use the relative price
deflators of the manufacturing sector to proxy for tradables. The value-added measure for all
industries and all trading partners is from Robert Johnson (https://sites.google.com/
site/robjohnson41/research); for the euro area and the main trading partners, I use the
price deflators in KLEMS for Portugal, the euro area, and Spain, Germany, and France.
Table 4: The source is KLEMS. The five main-industry codes are manufacturing (D),
construction (F), real estate, renting, and business activities (K), community, social, and
personal services (LtQ), and wholesale and retail trade (G).
Table 5: Total factor productivity corresponds to the TFP measures in KLEMS. For
markups I again use KLEMS to calculate the log of the ratio between VA (value added) and
LAB (labor compensation).
Table 6: The debt figures come from the OECD. The numbers for taxes come from the
annex to the European Commission report on taxation trends in the European Union (ec.
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europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/
index_en.htm). The numbers for the categories of spending come from Eurostat via Oh and
Reis (2012). The old-age pension statistics come form the OECD and Eurostat.
Figure 4: All data are from the irs.m series of the European Central Bank statistical
warehouse on long-term interest rates for convergence purposes.
Figure 6: All series come from the Banco de Portugal website. I start from the net in-
ternational investment position reported for December 2007. The series for net foreign assets
is this quarterly series over time, the cumulative current account starts from that value and
accumulates the balance in the current account. The breakdown into the three sectors is
from the financial account.
Figure 7: All series are from AMECO and Eurostat, in its statistics for government
finances.
Finally, the more recent numbers for the Portuguese economy reported in section 4 all
come from the website of the Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
B More Details on the Model
There are three types of agents: entrepreneurs, banks, and households. I discuss each in
turn, using lowercase letters to denote individual choices by entrepreneurs, capital letters to
denote their aggregate, and capital letters with a hat (such as Cˆ) to denote the choices of
the representative household.
B.1 The Entrepreneurs’ Problem
A continuum of entrepreneurs, with density G(a), at date t choose {ct, nt, kt, dt+1, bt+1} in


























dt+1 ≥ 0, bt+1 ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0. (4)
The choice of nt has no intertemporal dimension, so we can find the optimum directly by
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t − wtnt = xt−1kt−1 (5)














The entrepreneur then has three investment options available at date t: capital with
return xt, lending with return rt, and borrowing with return rbt . I will later verify that
rt ≥ rbt in equilibrium. Moreover, if xt is higher than rbt , clearly the collateral constraint will
bind, so that investing in the firm gives a leveraged return. Therefore, the choice is whether
to save in the bank, earning return rt, or use the production technology, earning a leveraged









which is larger than xt as long as θ > 0 and rbt > 0, that is, as long as the entrepreneur can
profitably leverage her investment. This return on investing in capital at t for producing at
t+ 1 is a function of the individual at and the aggregate pNt+1 and wt+1, all via the definition
of xt in equation 6. I use the notation Rt,t+1(at) to capture this dependence.
The net worth of the entrepreneur is the right-hand side of the budget constraint in
equation 2: zt = xt−1kt−1 + dt − bt. If Rt,t+1(at) = rt, then kt = bt−1 = 0, and zt = dt, so
the entrepreneur invests all his funds in the financial market. Otherwise, if Rt,t+1(at) > rt,
then dt = 0, and the collateral constraint binds, so bt+1 = θxtkt > 0, and investment is
constrained by net worth: xtkt = zt+1/(1 − θ). The threshold a∗t , such that entrepreneurs
with productivity higher than a∗t produce, while those below a∗t are inactive and save in the
bank, is then the solution to the following equation:
Rt,t+1(a
∗
t ) = rt. (9)
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zt+1 = Rt,t+1(at)(zt − ptct) and zt ≥ 0. (11)
This is a standard problem with solution:
ptct = (1− β)zt (12)
zt+1 = Rt,t+1(at)βzt. (13)
B.2 The Banks’ Problem
A representative bank at date t chooses Bt+1, Ft+1, Dt+1 to solve the problem










Ft+1 ≤ φBt+1, (16)
Dt+1 ≥ 0 Bt+1 ≥ 0 Ft+1 ≥ 0. (17)
I will throughout consider equilibria where rf < rt if φ > 0, in which case the foreign
financing constraint holds with equality: Ft+1 = φBt+1. Moreover, in equilibrium banks earn











It then follows that rt ≥ rbt , as I imposed on the entrepreneurs’ problem.












Using this definition and the equilibrium equation (equation 9) gives the firm-selection
curve discussed in the text.
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B.3 Market Clearing for Loans
The other optimality condition for banks implies that
(1− φ)Bt+1 = Dt+1. (20)
This is a market-clearing condition, requiring that the domestically financed loans made to
active entrepreneurs equal the deposits collected from inactive entrepreneurs. Returning to



















Here the first equality is the definition of aggregate loans, the second uses the binding
collateral constraint and the definition of net worth, the third is the law of motion for net
worth, and the fourth uses the fact that with i.i.d. productivity returns, the entrepreneur’s
past net worth zt and his new return Rt,t+1(at) are orthogonal. Zt is the aggregate net worth
across all entrepreneurs.





















This is the market-clearing condition in the text.























The first equality comes from the definition of aggregates, the second from the evolution of
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individual net worth in equation 13, the third uses the independence of zt and Rt,t+1(at) as
well as the definition in equation 19, and the fourth uses the market-clearing relationship in
equation 23.
B.4 Households
















t − wtNˆt − Fˆt + (1− τ)wtLˆt + Tt, (26)
Fˆt ≤ AKˆαt−1Nˆ1−αt − wtNˆt. (27)







The collateral constraint does not distort production decisions, so the agent must earn zero
profits in production; otherwise she would expand or shrink production without bounds.
The zero-profit condition is







Note that this equation pins down the pre-tax wage as a function solely of the foreign interest
rate.








Finally, for the optimal choice of consumption, because I assume that β < 1/rf , I know that
eventually the borrowing constraint will hold. Since I start from a steady state, this is true
then and after, so that foreign borrowing sustains all of the capital in the tradables sector,
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and consumption is equal to labor and transfer income:
Cˆt =






Here the second equality uses the government budget constraint, τwtLˆt = Tt.
B.5 Consumption of Nontradables
Both households and entrepreneurs share the same Cobb-Douglas aggregator over the two
goods with weight γ on the nontradable good. Optimal allocation of their budget comes
with the following two conditions:
pNt C¯
N
t = γptC¯t (32)
pt = γ
−γ(1− γ)−(1−γ)pNγt (33)




Focusing on the first of these equations, first note that for the market to clear, the amount
consumed of nontradables must equal the amount produced by the entrepreneurs: C¯Nt = Y Nt .
In turn, because the production function is Cobb-Douglas, we know that for every active





1− α = γptC¯t = γ (wtLt + (1− β)Zt) . (34)
Here the last equality uses the optimal consumption choices by entrepreneurs in equation 12
and likewise for households in equation 31.
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The first equality uses the definition of the aggregate, the second uses the labor demand
in equation 7, the third uses the binding collateral constraint for capital, the fourth uses
the definition of xt in equation 6, and the last equation uses the equilibrium conditions in
equations 23 and 24.
Using this expression to replace for Nt, I then obtain the final condition:[
1
γα(1− θφ) + β − 1
]
Zt = wtLt. (36)
B.6 A Reduced-Form Equilibrium
Recall that from equation 29, the equilibrium wage wt+1 is entirely pinned down by the ex-
ogenous foreign interest rate rf . Starting with a given net worth of the entrepreneurs Zt and
an exogenous wage wt+1, a reduced-form equilibrium is a collection of {Lt+1, a∗t , rt, pNt+1, Zt+1}









γα(1− θφ) + β − 1
]


















where R is defined as in equations 19 and 6.
Solving this system is relatively easy because of its particular structure. Start with
finding a steady state. For a guess at the value of a∗, equation 39 gives r, equation 40 (with
equations 6 and 19) gives pN , and equation 41 verifies the guess. Equations 37 and 38 then
give L and Z, respectively. The only difficulty is in solving the integral. But because this
is an integral of the form
∫
a1/α/(1− ξa1/α)dG(a), then for a uniform distribution for a, its
solution is known and equal to a hypergeometric function. If instead a1/α is uniform, then
the integral is equal to a log function.
To instead find a dynamic perfect-foresight path, note that the first three equations can
be used to eliminate Zt+1 and Lt+1, leaving three equations in three variables {a∗t , rt, pNt }.
Equation 40 can be further used to eliminate rt from the system, leaving two messy equations
in {a∗t , pNt }. Guessing a value for a∗t , backing out the implied pNt , and then checking equation
41 gives a quick algorithm. It takes a few seconds to solve.
B.7 Other Variables of Interest
Once the reduced-form equilibrium has been derived, one can obtain other variables of in-


























Nˆt = Lt −Nt (46)
Yˆt = (1− α)wtNˆt (47)
Fˆt = αYˆt (48)
Kˆt−1 = Fˆt/r∗ (49)
Ct =




In the figures I plot aggregate output and TFP, defined, respectively, as







t + a¯)/2 (52)
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